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29 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Comments on Proposed Crew Control Procedures

1. A generalized summary of the objectives of the proposed crew control procedures might properly be that effective crew control methods are vital to the successful implementation and completion of mission and that the methods used should be made a matter of record to assure both the integrity of the program and agreement on the principles to be followed. With this in mind the manner in which the program is introduced is important.

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2. It is not known whether it is extended to use the proposed crew control procedures for specific briefings to each [redacted] or as a program guide for [redacted]. In either event, it is suggested that the preventative value of the program may be seriously impaired should wrong inferences be drawn from the highlighted grounding sanctions applicable to obesity. It may well be that obesity is presently a problem which is difficult to correct and deserves to be singled out. However, depending on how it is controlled, it could be cause for concern in both the (a) administration of the [redacted] contract and (b) in achieving the actual objectives set forth for the entire program.

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3. Contract. Grounding action would call for invoking the "general duty status" provision of the contract. At a minimum this means a \$750 monthly drop in pay. Since obesity by itself does not constitute "loss of personnel proficiency", the contract basis for grounding would have to be because "it is in the best interest of the contemplated activities." What is in the "best interest of the contemplated activities" is not defined but rather is left to the discretion of the Agency. *This eliminated* The necessity of stating specifically, if one could, what action or inaction either within or beyond the control of the individual could lead to such grounding. Yet, when one reads the language of the crew control procedures the specifics are drawn so tightly that one gets the impression that an arbitrary line has been drawn and should anyone step over it he will be automatically grounded. However, as the section on overweight is presently written, grounding is not mandatory but only permissive. Therefore, the specific arbitrary weight limits

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and the time table for weight reductions are not really controlling. The controlling factor thus must be whether overweight in a particular case would, in the opinion of the flight surgeon, impair the [ ] ability to perform missions, and even if this is so a voluntary weight reduction program would be suggested and if not followed, then either threat of or actual grounding would follow. If these observations are correct, then it is recommended that the [ ] not be briefed specifically on the obesity provisions and that each case be handled on its individual merits as we have every right to do under the contract.

4. Affect in Achieving Program Objectives. Another important consideration in determining whether the [ ] should be alerted to the obesity sanctions unless and until actually necessary is that the entire crew control program is preventative in nature. It runs the whole gamut of an individual's physiological and psychological life, some aspects of which, particularly in the psychological area, can best be seen through the "cooperative" eyes of the individual. Failure to meet "unpublished" standards in these areas would also be proper grounds for grounding. Thus, should the whole crew control procedures be thought of by [ ] as one strongly supported by published sanctions, they could defeat the program by giving the "correct" answers which they feel we want to hear. With the small number of [ ] involved and the fact that we have an extremely high operational talent at [ ] to whom these problems are not unique as well as an extremely competent flight surgeon, it would seem that the preferable course of action would be to use the procedures as a guide only for the detachment and that we not publish material from which inferences of arbitrariness can be drawn.

5. The suggestion that annual [ ] physicals be staggered and not run in mass is a very good idea and would be satisfactory to [ ]. However, if we desire to maintain the security we have followed with [ ] heretofore, then it is suggested that we continue to lay on examination scheduling, etc., between [ ] and the Agency through Headquarters and directly between the flight surgeon and [ ].

6. In paragraph IV, it appears that what is being defined is the number of the elapsed hours in the air after which a decidedly different physiological and psychological stress will be encountered. Probably there is disagreement when such extra stress will be encountered. Therefore, the best course is to

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go with the best professional opinion and arbitrarily back those limits. This is especially important when the Commander and/or his flight surgeon will be held responsible for implementing the program. For what it is worth several [ ] have stated that there is no distinction between a 9 and a 11 hour mission. Whether this is so or not, it appears that a line must be drawn and it has not been drawn by statements such as "between 10 and 12 hours or lesser duration - the entire crew control procedure may be affected" and in "missions of 10 to 12 hours or more - they will be affected." 25X1A

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